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Introduction 
In recent years, the federal prison population has soared—according to the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Bureau of Prison’s (BOP) rates of incarceration 
increased by 400 percent from 1980 to 2012, and by about 50 percent alone since the year 2000 
(GAO, 2012; 1). These numbers are even more disturbing when one considers that men and 
women of color systematically receive harsher and longer sentences for crimes than do their 
white counterparts and are three times more likely to be profiled by police; although blacks and 
Hispanics constitute only 30 percent of the American population, they account for 60% of the 
American prison population (Kerby, 2013). For Angela Y. Davis (2003), these gross disparities 
should be understood as a form of racialized exile—a place to lock away “ ‘criminals’ and 
‘evildoers’…fantasized as people of color” (Davis 16). By way of the prison, an “ideologicial” 
mechanism of control, the privileged are rid of social “undesirables”—“relieving us of the 
responsibility of thinking about the real issues afflicting those communities from which prisoners 
are drawn in such disproportionate numbers” (Davis Ibid.)  Ideological public attitudes, in 
addition to other factors such as harsh and unrealistic sentencing (especially drug sentencing) 
and private entities that profit from prisons, contribute to recidivism rates and keep prison 
populations high.   
Unprecedented incarceration rates have in turn led to an unprecedented number of prisons 
exceeding their “rated capacity;” meaning, more and more prisons house far more incarcerated 
persons than what the Department of Justice deems “safe” or “secure” (GAO, 2). Attempts taken 
to “mitigate the effects” of overcrowding include triple-bunking, limiting educational and drug 
programs, “staggering” mealtimes, and using “disciplinary infractions” as an excuse to 
“segregate” insiders from one another (Ibid.). Although such steps are intended to promote order, 
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they often have the opposite effect, propagating an even tenser atmosphere due to the added 
psychological pressures that insiders and prison guards face. Nonetheless, BOP officials insist 
that “[ensuring] the safety, security, and orderly operation of correctional facilities, as well as the 
protection of the public,” will require vigilance on the part of (overworked) staff to “impose 
sanctions on inmates who commit prohibited acts” (Ibid., 81-82). In short, in the face of tenuous 
prison conditions, it is argued, discipline and order become the top priorities.  
As Lorna A. Rhodes (2007) explains, the idea of the supermax prison is often construed 
as a solution to overcrowding and unsafe prison conditions. Incarcerated individuals are sent to 
supermax facilities for long-term or indefinite periods of time, and are placed in austere isolated 
cells with little external stimuli and with severe restrictions on activities and work opportunities 
(Leena and Morris, 2001). The supermax, as it was originally conceived, was to be a 
“specialized” form of “absolute exclusion” designed to separate the “worst of the worst” from 
the general prison population (Rhodes, 550-551). In practice, however, supermax placement is 
determined far less often by the crime for which a person is incarcerated or the severity of 
infractions committed on the inside, and far more often by a general “need” to establish order 
and discipline in the face of more commonplace problems such as “mental illness, need for 
protection, the accumulation of multiple minor infractions, or membership in ‘threat’ groups” 
(what groups are considered a “threat” is often coded in terms of race) (Ibid., 551). For example, 
in 2012, the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) reported that 1 in 4 New York prisoners 
had been placed in extreme isolation for some period of time during that year. Only 16% of those 
instances involved either weapons or assault (NYCLU, 2012). In one instance, a New York 
inmate was given 30 days of solitary confinement for “continuing a conversation with another 
prisoner after a corrections officer ordered him to stop” (Kim 2012, 17). As Rhodes explains, the 
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supermax prison, which “imposes a deep personal isolation on prisoners,” has become 
increasingly lauded as a practical, efficient, scientific and “common sense” means of organizing 
prison life, rather than a measure reserved for extreme cases (Ibid., 552).       
With this background in mind, this paper explores and attempts to unite these two (not-
quite-so) disparate issues regarding the American prison industrial complex1; that is, incarcerated 
persons often endure conditions of social (and sensory) deprivation, alienation and isolation on 
the one hand, and, on the other hand, they also are subject to a lack of privacy, constant 
surveillance, and overcrowding. From a narrow perspective, one might be tempted to frame the 
problem thus: When critiquing prison conditions, which issues—isolation and solitary 
confinement or lack of privacy and overcrowding—should take precedence? I call this question 
“narrow” because it posits a false dichotomy, suggesting that there might be a contradiction 
between advocating for an insider’s right to privacy or her right to human interaction. From a 
reform-based perspective (one which aims to make prisons more humane while keeping the 
overall structure intact), advocating for one or the other could seem like a “conflict of interest,” 
at least at the policy level (e.g., what about insiders who prefer solitary confinement as a means 
of avoiding conflict with other insiders?). I pose the question, however, for a different purpose: 
to analyze both forms of deprivation (private and social) in tandem, in order to better understand, 
and contribute to a broader critique of, the very existence of the modern prison industrial 
complex.  
I argue that the work of Hannah Arendt can serve as an important resource for thinking 
about the psychic spaces within prison walls and, more broadly, public attitudes that perpetuate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Angela Davis first used the phrase “Prison Industrial Complex” in 1997. The label refers to a 
complex set of institutions that profit from prisons including, but not limited to, the prison 
industry itself (Davis, 1998).	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prison conditions. Many insiders testify that cultivating a robust intellectual life and a 
connectedness to a political community are necessary both for resistance and, indeed, for 
survival itself. In order to think further about strategies for community formation within prison, I 
revisit Arendt’s idea that private spaces for thought are constitutive with the political world that 
makes speech, action, narrative, and meaning-making possible. Arendt’s public/private 
distinction is in one sense, quite literally about places in the material world. However, it is 
equally about the psychic life of any given space—about how spaces can give rise to another 
kind of world,  one which connects us to ourselves and to our communities.  
Moreover, I will explore some of Arendt’s concerns about the breakdown of private and 
public spaces regarding the formation of the nation-state in an attempt to draw an (albeit 
imperfect) analogy between Arendt’s concept of “statelessness” and the status of the modern 
incarcerated person as one who is simultaneously removed from public life but who are yet 
confined within the state. The breakdown of public and private spaces (in the Arendtian sense) 
within prison walls today should be understood as a symptom of broader cultural attitudes about 
what constitutes a democratic society. The prisoner represents the undesirable, the traitor of the 
polis, and it is her absence that ensures tenuous political stability. Exiled, she is condemned to be 
neither properly seen nor properly heard, even to herself; she is the property of the state and yet 
belongs nowhere. It is worth noting that although Arendt can prove useful in the aforementioned 
ways, and Arendt’s thought contains particular limitations and problems. Arendt is not a helpful 
source for envisioning a plurality of publics and communities, nor is, I argue, her thought 
capable of effectively countenancing complex and ongoing histories of racial, sexual and gender 
oppression operative within those publics. My concern lies, ultimately, with thinking about the 
possibility of political communities both within the prison and between insiders and outsiders 
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that will take us “beyond” Arendt, so to speak. As such, I will conclude with a further 
exploration of the ways in which prisoners speak and resist in spite of the ways in which they 
have been rendered invisible in law and in public discourse. 
Prison Spaces 
 Survival in Solitary (2008), a guide written by prisoners for prisoners, provides 
first-hand accounts of the psychic effects of solitary confinement. Solitary confinement is a form 
of profound sensory and social deprivation in which incarcerated persons are confined to a small 
windowless cell for 23 hours each day (Ibid., 4). Inmate Ronald Epps describes the “Sensory 
Deprivation Experience” as one in which “all five basic human senses—sight, sound, smell, 
touch and taste—are severely suppressed” (Ibid., 6). This suppression, compounded with 
persistent deprivation of “direct human contact” results in a severe form of “social dislocation” 
or alienation, and can deeply augment the prisoner’s ability to connect with others (Ibid., 7). 
Epps recounts the difficulty he had readjusting to contact with other prisoners after a year in 
solitary: 
Upon seeing me for the first time in over a year, a fellow prisoner shook my hand and 
then proceeded to put both arms around me to embrace me and I became visibly shaken 
and cringed up as if I had been physically violated. I had not had any physical contact 
with another human being in so long that I wasn’t used to being touched. I had become 
super-sensitive to one of the basic human senses – the sense of human touch. (Ibid., 6) 
In order for one to buy into the aforementioned idea, common among the supporters of supermax 
facilities, that to isolate and segregate inmates, to “highlight the separateness, uniformity, and 
‘otherness’ of supermax prisoners” (Rhodes, 560) is a matter of mere common sense (for reasons 
of efficiency, etc..), one would have to ignore the obvious physiological trauma that can result 
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from prolonged physical separation from other human beings.  Lisa Guenther’s (2013) 
conception of “hinged subjectivity,” understood as the “constitutive intertwining of the embodied 
self with the bodies of others” may be helpful for understanding the depths of such trauma (1). 
When one becomes “unhinged,” her “interrelational subjectivity” has broken apart;	  we are all 
“hinged subjects who can become unhinged when the concrete experience of other embodied 
subjects is foreclosed” (Ibid., 1). As a result of the violent conditions of solitary confinement, 
Epps became hypersensitive to the touch of other human beings because he was denied this 
fundamental, corporeal aspect of intersubjectivity.  Unable to endure the general prison setting, 
and “more anti-social than ever before,” Epps explains that he was eventually placed in punitive 
segregation for refusing to be celled with another inmate. Epps remains concerned that his 
experiences in solitary have “ruined” his ability to fit into any social setting, that he is now unfit 
for society (Ibid., 8). Inmate Abdul O. Shakur echoes these concerns, arguing that ex-convicts 
who have been in solitary confinement need therapy in order to re-adjust to life outside the 
prison (Ibid., 9). 
Unfortunately, solitary confinement is not the only form of social deprivation that can be 
observed in prison. In “Live From the Panopticon” (1993) inmates at Maryland State 
Penitentiary, a maximum security prison, attest to the fact that lack of privacy, through 
surveillance or lack of space, can also serve to alienate prisoners from one-another. Prisoner H.B. 
Johnson Jr. speaks of the ways in which guards have been able to sow dissent among inmates by 
using them as informants against one-another:  
I…thought about what Foucault said about the docile subordinate creature that they try to 
turn a human being into, and I began to think that it's no longer just by way of an 
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architectural structure. Human beings serve the same purpose…The human being 
becomes a machine, serving the same purpose as that guard tower serves. (Ibid., 213)  
Under these conditions, prison relationships are often characterized by a lack of trust or even the 
sense that other prisoners are dangerous. In these circumstances, insiders experience a form of 
isolation that is not at all private, but in fact extremely “public” in the sense that there is 
excessive exposure to and a wariness of other human beings. It is not at all hard to see that any 
attempts at a formation of solidarity could be risky, for, predictably, this ethos of watchfulness 
might render minimally “un-policed” exchanges between insiders unlikely.  
Overcrowding is also a problem. Inmate John Woodland explains that “the cell is not 
really big enough for one person, but they put two in there…it seems like they tried to make as 
efficient a use of space as possible. It’s just enough to live in. No more.” (Ibid., 208). He later 
explains that the prison space, or lack thereof, impedes healthy interaction or a healthy sense of 
self in relation to others: “You’ve got to holler because it seems like you’ve always gotta talk 
over somebody at a distance or that there’s something separating you from that person. It kind of 
makes you feel different than normal, I mean from everyday people” (Ibid., 210). In a space 
where one must always shout, how can one’s voice ever truly be “heard” (literally and 
metaphorically)? In a space where others are always shouting, can one “fully hear” another’s 
voice? Again we see a case in which certain spaces might be ostensibly “public” or “social” in 
the sense that they involve the presence of many human sharing a common space, but wherein 
these crowded spaces actually evoke a personal feelings of isolation and separation from others.   
It might be tempting to think that conditions for prisoners can be improved simply by 
cultivating “better” public spaces. After all, if the problem is simply having a forum from which 
to speak and to hear another, why not work on that? Or perhaps strategies could be developed by 
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inmates to support one another so as to not cave into the pressure to police one another? Surely, 
such moves might be necessary. But Donald Thompson, corroborating the testimony of the 
others, notes that there are certain limitations to a valuation of solidarity and community 
formation if it is not also coupled with an appreciation for the need to cultivate private spaces: “I 
agree the community should be structured as to bring people together. By bringing them together 
you create a sort of political power. All right. But at the same time, there’s a kind of trick hidden 
there” (Ibid. 209). Thompson compares the visibility of the prison with that of the projects, 
where houses face one another and there is little privacy: “instead of giving people a common 
power, it actually takes power away from them” (Ibid., 209). These housing projects, which are 
ostensibly structured to support a meaningful sense of community, ultimately fail to do so if this 
sense of community comes at the expense of one’s privacy. Woodland agrees, noting that 
“there’s a degree of privacy, I think, that everybody needs and must have,” without which, 
human interaction quickly becomes strained (Ibid., 209).  
But what is this “privacy” that everyone needs? Why do we need it? And what does 
privacy have to do with relationships? In the next section, I analyze the themes discussed in this 
section through an Arendtian lens. For Arendt, the world of politics is logically impossible 
without private introspection, and vice versa.  
Arendt and the Public/Private Distinction 
Hannah Arendt’s work attests to the necessity of cultivating both public and private 
spaces. For Arendt, privacy is necessary for thought, and thinking requires a temporary departure 
from the world (Life of the Mind 1978, 23). By “world,” Arendt refers to the “public” space of 
appearances that is “common to all of us and distinguished from our privately owned place in it;” 
this world, “like every in-between, relates and separates men at the same time” (The Human 
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Condition, 52). Arendt somewhat poetically asserts, by contrast, that in thinking one experiences 
a metaphorical death "in anticipation of our final departure” (Life of the Mind., 83): when an 
individual thinks, “temporal as well as spatial distances" are annihilated, as one becomes 
surrounded "not by sense objects but by images that are invisible to everyone else” (Ibid.). This 
private space, assured through the maintenance of private property becomes the “reliable hiding 
place from the common public world, not only from everything that goes on in it but also from 
its very publicity, from being seen or heard” (The Human Condition, 71). Privacy, as such, offers 
a safe-haven away from the public eye.  
Why does one need a private space of reflection to “hide,” or to retreat to? Because a life 
lived only in the presence of others becomes, at best, a “shallow” life (Ibid.). At worst, one may 
become like Adolf Eichmann, who seemed to typify the “mendacity that had constituted the 
general, and generally accepted, atmosphere of the Third Reich” (Eichmann in Jerusalem, 52)	  ). 
A self-proclaimed speaker of “Officialese [Amtssprache]” Eichmann seemed incapable, 
according to Arendt, of an original thought or even the ability “to think,” in terms separate from 
Nazi ideology (Ibid.).	  His cliché answers, his inability to view himself as culpable of any 
wrongdoing, his dull preoccupation with procedures and promotions, seem to indicate for Arendt 
an evacuation of the self, the complete absence of the two-in-one (which I will get to in a 
moment). According to Arendt, totalitarianism, or any form of “mass society” seeks to collapse 
the private and public realms into that of “social” convention (The Human Condition, 52). In 
contemporary, modernized society, Arendt thinks that “while we have become excellent in the 
laboring we perform in public, our capacity for action and speech has lost much of its former 
quality since the rise of the social realm banished these into the sphere of the intimate and the 
private.” (Ibid., 49).  This idea, explains, in part, how under the influence of the totalitarian, and  
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technocratic, Nazi regime, Eichmann could mistakenly believe he has agency when in fact he is a 
mere tool of the state.    
On the other hand, while it is necessary to cultivate these solitary spaces of reflection, 
Arendt is equally adamant that "no human life, not even the life of the hermit in nature's 
wilderness, is possible without a world which directly or indirectly testifies to the presence of 
other human beings” (The Human Condition 1958, 22). Arendt is quite critical of Martin 
Heidegger, who’s work she thinks unduly privileges solitude. Although for Heidegger Dasein is 
always also Mitsein, “it is this kind of being, the mode of everyday being, whose explication 
makes visible what we might call the “subject” of everydayness, the they” (Being and Time, 
114). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt’s fundamental issue with Heidegger was that he 
understood being-with-others ultimately as a hindrance to authentic being (Benhabib, 53). For 
Heidegger, it is being-towards-death, the moment where Mitsein drops away, that discloses 
Dasein’s potentiality: “With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-
being…Thus immanent to itself, all relations to other Dasein are dissolved in it. This 
nonrelational ownmost possibility is at the same time the most extreme one” (Being and Time., 
250-251).  
In her account of thinking, Arendt resuscitates Heideggerian being-toward-death in the 
context of the political world of appearances, such that Dasein's being-toward-death must also be 
matched by a reemergence into the world. For Arendt, when one is aware of his existence in 
relation to a plurality of beings, thinking functions to negate the Heideggerian problem of “the 
they” by producing a "duality of myself with myself” (the “two-in-one,” which Eichmann 
lacked) that makes thinking a true activity (The Human Condition, 185).  As such, one can 
engage in both dialectical conversation with others as well as with oneself (Ibid). For Arendt, the 
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private affair of thinking is the prerequisite for judgment (Life of the Mind, 92); and it functions 
to disrupt the "ordinary processes of life," the mundane facets of our existence.   
For Arendt, otherness establishes both uniqueness/difference and yet, paradoxically, in is 
precisely the quality of uniqueness that "man shares" with other men (The Human Condition, 
176). For Arendt, in order to seriously pursue Heidegger's question of the meaning of being, one 
must begin by studying this "paradoxical plurality of unique beings” (Ibid., 176). Self-
understanding can only take place following self-disclosure; that is, it is by disclosing oneself in 
the public space, in relation with others, both in terms of "equality and distinction", where one 
can endeavor to understand existence (Ibid., 175). Disclosure is situated in the distinctly political 
realm of appearance--in the "subjective in-between" space, the "web of human relationships 
which exists wherever men live together" that speaks to "some worldly objective reality” (Ibid, 
182-184)." This is why Arendt asserts that "the originally intangible manifestation of a uniquely 
distinct ‘who’ can become tangible ex post facto through action and speech” (Ibid., 186).  
It is the absence of the two-in-one that produces “loneliness.” For Arendt, an individual 
may be physically alone but if she ceases to hold a dialogue with herself, losing her capacity to 
think, then she is alone. As Benhabib (2003) explains, loneliness emerges for Arendt as identity 
markers are destroyed, creating a group of “lonely masses” (Benhabib, 66). The real problem 
with “mass society,” Arendt asserts, becomes realized when the “world between” individuals has 
“lost its power to gather them together, to relate and to separate them” (The Human Condition, 
52-53). Arguably, overcrowding and solitary confinement produce loneliness in prison in much 
the same way. Both the prisoner’s sense of self and simultaneously her sense of community can 
be disrupted by either extreme forms of isolation or a lack of private space for reflection. On the 
one hand, “to live an entirely private life means above all to be deprived of things essential to 
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human life…to be seen and heard by others” (The Human Condition, 58). On the other hand, 
“the privation of privacy lies in the absence of others; as far as they are concerned, private man 
does not appear, and therefore it is as though he did not exist.”  In other words, to lack privacy 
means lacking space or distance for constituting oneself in relation to others. This disposition 
produces the “mass phenomenon of loneliness,” whereby one becomes lonely in the 
overwhelming presence of others (Ibid., 58-59). In either case, Arendt asserts, one has become 
“deprived” of their ability to see or hear others, and of “being heard by them” (Ibid., 58). In an 
interesting choice of words, she continues by saying “They are all imprisoned in the subjectivity 
of their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular” even if that same 
experience is replicated countless times (Ibid.)  
 This idea of  repetitive singularity might be able to shed light on Lorna Rhodes 
observation that prison “problems” in the supermax have become “increasingly framed in terms 
of absolute culpability; the criminal is divorced from any form of social connection and entered 
into a world of numbers and calculation…the machinery of isolation promises to strip from these 
prisoners the elements that sustain personhood and citizenship” (Rhodes, 551-552).  Perhaps, 
then, the breakdown of private and public spaces in prison is not coincidental, but instead, can be 
traced to the treatment of the prisoner’s “personhood and citizenship” in law and public 
discourse.  
 
 
Statelessness and Civil Death 
In the introduction to Survival in Solitary it is stated that the torturous treatment of 
solitary confinement in maximum security prisons reflects general social attitudes, and should be 
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viewed as “representations of the angry and cruel repression that grips our country today” (4). I 
argue that Arendt’s account of “statelessness” read in conjunction with Colin Dayan’s work on 
civil death can be informative for thinking about how the hermeneutics of this “repression.” 
works.  Arendt argues that the phenomenon of statelessness gained its full effect after the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man in Europe.; for, ironically, the assertion of man’s “supposedly 
inalienable” rights “proves” their unenforceability (Origins of Totalitarianism, 293). The newly 
evoked human rights, understood as arising out of “individuals [who] needed protection against 
the new sovereignty of the state and the new arbitrariness of society” (as opposed to earlier eras, 
where the force of law was derived from religious doctrine), were supposedly “inalienable,” 
meaning, according to Arendt, the Rights of Man transcended other forms of legal authority 
(Ibid., 291). As such, paradoxically, the Jews and other “pariahs” gained their human status, 
albeit in the most “abstract” of terms, to the detriment of the possibility of  protection by any 
particular state.  Arendt argues; “only the emancipated sovereignty of the people, of one’s own 
people, seemed to be able to ensure” the Rights of Man (Ibid.).    
Writing on Arendt’s condemnation of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, Colin Dayan  
adds, that “when such persons take the designation of “enemy” or “unlawful combatant,” they 
are in effect without a country, without a cause, and hence unprotected by the Geneva 
framework” (“Legal Terrors,” 70). Unlike Arendt, however, who considers the status of the “the 
deprived—the refugee, the stateless, the Jew made rightless before being exterminated, and the 
Negro ‘in a white community’”—to be “distinct from that of the criminal,” Dayan argues that all 
of these “entities,” the criminal included, “exist outside the legal definition of persons” (Ibid., 
70). And indeed, political prisoner Russell “Maroon” Shoats and former political prisoner Assata 
Shakur (currently still wanted by the FBI and living in exile in Cuba) often refer to themselves as 
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“marooned slaves” and “political refugees,” asserting, in essence, that criminality in the United 
States is tantamount to statelessness.	   
Dayan poses the question: “What does it mean, in the words of Hannah Arendt in The 
Origins of Totalitarianism, ‘to be out of legality altogether,’ to be ‘outside the scope of all 
tangible law’?” (Ibid). Criminals, she asserts, although physically alive, are rendered dead in 
law; civil death becomes the framework through which criminal (and, relatedly, the slave) 
“though possessing natural life, has lost all civil rights” (“Legal Slaves Civil Bodies, 6). Much 
like the notion of the social contract was constituted by the existence of the “savage” who lay 
outside the bounds of civil society, “ 
The terms of law and their rationalization of custody and control not only devise a 
philosophy of personhood but, in creating the legal subject, also summons forms of 
punishment that are activated only when people of a certain “nature”—those labeled as 
unfit, subhuman, barbaric, or in numerous prison officials’, as well as Donald Rumsfeld’s 
phrasing, “the worst of the worst”—are to be restrained in their liberty, deprived of 
rights, and ultimately, undone as persons (“Legal Terrors,” 46).  
 The legal fiction of civil death renders social deprivation and overall cruel treatment of prisoners 
just in the name of their criminal status, their status as enemies of the state.  
Over the course of American history, this logic of exclusion has taken many forms—
genocide of Native Americans, Slavery, and Jim Crow Laws, the Japanese internment camps, 
etc. It is worth noting that the 13th amendment forbade slavery, with one important exception, 
stating that “neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof 
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States.” In other words, 
prisons were understood as the logical extension of the institution of slavery. Analogously, 
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Michelle Alexander (2012) demonstrates that, “what has changed since the collapse of Jim Crow 
has less to do with the basic structure of our society than with the language we use to justify 
it…Rather than rely on race, we use our criminal justice system to label people of color 
‘criminals’ and then engage in all the practices we have supposedly left behind” (The New Jim 
Crow, 2). These “old” forms of violence have not been eradicated, but have simply been 
displaced. This is no more apparent than within the prison walls themselves, where the 
breakdown of public and private spaces reflects the ambivalent legal status of prisoners.  
Concerns about the Public/Private Distinction 
As indicated earlier, Arendt does not provide an adequate framework for thinking of 
plurality in terms of different communities with intersecting and even competing narratives and 
histories. Even Arendt’s endorsement of a fairly strict public/private distinction comes with its 
own problems. Angela Davis explains, liberal theoretical categories like “public and private” 
(although she does not mention Arendt in particular) often serve to mask or render invisible the 
experiences of prisoners. Prison conditions for women, for example, reflect “the patriarchal 
power circuits from the state to the home, which are disconnected by the ideological division of 
the ‘public’ and the ‘private,’ thus rendering the underlying complexities of women’s 
punishment invisible” (“Public Imprisonment and Private Violence,” 342). Seyla Benhabib also 
levels a concern that “some of Arendt’s characteristic distinctions as between the ‘public realm 
of politics’ and the ‘private realm of the household’ appear to condemn women in the most 
traditional ways to the private sphere of care for the necessities of daily life” (The Reluctant 
Modernism of Hannah Arendt, xxxiii). These worries speak to a more general question about the 
inflexibility of liberal categories and forms of exclusion that these categories often justify. In 
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order to address concerns about Arendt’s public/private distinction, it may be helpful to turn to 
postcolonial theorists who have attempted to address and critique this aspect of Arendt’s thought.  
Post-colonial theorist Homi Bhabha draws heavily from Arendt’s The Human Condition 
in his account of cultural identity and political plurality. Bhabha asserts that a fundamental issue 
for Arendt is the political uncertainty generated by the who-what distinction: “the disclosure of 
the who – the agent as individuation – is contiguous with the what of the intersubjective realms. 
This contiguous relation between who and what cannot be transcended but must be accepted as a 
form of indeterminism and doubling” (The Location of Culture 1994, 271). One’s “agency bears 
no mimetic immediacy or adequacy of representation (Ibid., 271),” and as such, “it is the public 
sphere of language and action that must be at once the theater and the screen for the 
manifestation of the capacities of human agency” (Ibid., 272). The agent of action “causes the 
narrative,” but this narrative is owned not by the agent himself but becomes property of the 
“intersubjective realm” of appearance. For Bhabha, Arendt’s insight about the intersubjective 
quality of meaning-making becomes particularly illuminating when considered from the vantage 
point of our post-colonial world, as marginalized groups attempt to come to terms with their 
histories and to understand their own traditions in relation to that history. These traditions are not 
static, but rather, they are constantly reified by competing narratives and accounts. Bhabha, 
expanding upon Arendts ideas, characterizes his own concept of hybridity as “a difference 
‘within’ a subject that inhabits the rim of an ‘in-between’ reality” (The Location of Culture 1994, 
19) such that one’s identity as part of a tradition and one’s understanding of cultural differences 
is necessarily marked with uncertainty and undecidability (Ibid., 51). Bhabha asserts that there 
can be “no unitary representation of political agency,” (41) and as such there cannot exist a 
“simple identity between the political objective and its means of representation” (39). 
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Where Bhabha departs from Arendt, he explains, is “liberal vision of togetherness” (Ibid., 
273). Arendt imagines that a “community, or the public sphere” is largely consensual (Ibid.). As 
such, Arendt cannot fully account for “social marginality as a product of the liberal state” (Ibid.). 
This, Bhabha contends, reveals the “limitations of its common sense (inter-est) of society” from 
the perspective of minorities or the marginalized (Ibid., 273). Importantly, both psychologically 
and politically speaking, articulations of identity are constituted by an, albeit ephemeral, moment 
of decision, so to speak.  Bhabha explains that while “political positions” cannot be determined 
“outside the terms and conditions of their discursive address” (Ibid., 33), it is precisely through 
the “agonistic process” of establishing difference qua “dissensus, alterity and otherness” that the 
“politicized subject” and “‘public’ truth” can be recognized (Ibid., 34). Agonism in regard to an 
other defines the political process from its very constitution. Arendt, indeed, expresses nostalgia 
for the “agonal spirit” of the Greek polis, however, her account remains individualistic, without a 
discussion of a broader cultural identity formation; indeed, for Arendt, “the public realm…was 
preserved for individuality” (The Human Condition, 41). As such, Bhabha concludes that the 
missing piece of Arendt’s political theory is an articulation of alternative modes of human 
togetherness based on cultural difference. 
In his essay “Peripheral Peoples and Narrative Identities: Arendtian Reflections on Late 
Modernity (1996),” Carlos A. Forment engages in a similar analysis of Arendt’s thought. 
Forment explains that “surveying the political landscape of late modernity with Arendtian lenses 
has persuaded me that ‘peripheral peoples’ are emblematic of contemporary public life in the 
same way that their immediate predecessors, Jewish pariahs and political refugees, were once 
associated with modernity” (Ibid., 314). By “peripheral peoples,” Forment refers to a diverse 
collection of marginalized peoples—from “ex-colonial subjects” to women to homosexuals. I 
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would add prisoners to this list. That is not to say that status of the prisoner is the same as that of 
other groups—indeed, the prisoner might even enjoy a “special status” as both an outsider, as an 
enemy of the state,  and at the same time as a law-breaker whose body and life have been seized 
by the state. However, it would be ridiculous to imagine that the social and civil status of the 
modern prisoner doesn’t have everything to do with a history of colonial and racial oppression, 
sexual oppression, etc… 
Similar to Bhabha, Forment extends beyond some of the more limiting aspects of 
Arendt’s thought to account for intersectional histories and alternatives to liberalism (Ibid., 324). 
Just as in Arendt’s day totalitarianism was made possible by the “marginalization of pariah’s and 
Jews,” so too is contemporary public life “marked by social exclusion (Ibid., 314). However, 
Arendt’s distinction between “pariah” and “parvenu” has become complicated by the emergence 
of transnational actors—“excolonials” living in the West whose very identities have been 
radically pluralized due to such dual loyalties (Ibid., 315). These actors are “embedded in hybrid 
forms of life; engaged in ‘social politics’ aimed at protecting their civil societies; and in constant 
dialogue with their heritage” (Ibid, 324). Their concern lies not in choosing between a 
“homeland” on the one hand and pure assimilation on the other, but rather, in finding a way to 
counteracting the totalizing logic of liberalism, which tends to “blur social boundaries and 
dissolve cultural and political markers” in the name of rights and liberties (Ibid). Marginalized 
and hybrid peoples of today have “experienced some of liberalism’s shortcomings” firsthand. 
The hybrid narratives that these groups have produced possess the unique capacity to “fuse 
particularism with universalism,” or, in Arendtian terms, equality and difference (Ibid). As such, 
Forment argues, peripheral groups have the opportunity today to use thought to “restructure 
public life” in a way that the Arendt’s “pariahs” did not (Ibid., 325). 
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  Criminals especially occupy this “hybrid” space. Historically and today, the poor 
and people of color who predominately make up the prison population in America have also 
experienced the “the shortcomings” of liberal-juridical constructs. Criminals have also been 
rendered “stateless,” have been denied legal rights and state protection from violence. As such, 
their voices and acts of resistance will play an integral role in rethinking the political landscape 
of exclusion, and the very notion of criminality itself.	  In the next section, I will address the ways 
in which prisoners have resisted the limitations of the prison space in order to cultivate political 
forms of speech and action. 
Conclusions: On Prison Resistance 
In the prison context, survival itself becomes a means of resisting by claiming life in the 
face of civil death. This assertion of life can often take tragic forms. For example, Dayan (2001) 
documents the troubling pervasiveness of self-mutilation among prisoners. She notes that the 
cruel and unusual effects of solitary confinement on a prisoner are legally recognized only 
“insofar as he becomes a senseless icon of the human, either mentally impaired or physically 
damaged,” even if that impairment is, in retrospect, a direct effect of prison treatment (“Legal 
Slaves and Civil Bodies,” 25). As such, Dayan argues, self-mutilation becomes a means for 
prisoners to “[reenact] the law’s process of decreation on their own bodies, making visible what 
the law masks” (Ibid., 28). This physical manifestation of psychic pain is comparable to Simone 
de Beauvoir’s description of the phenomenon of self-mutilation among adolescent girls. 
According to Beauvoir (2010), the young girl finds herself viewed increasingly as a flesh by 
herself and others, and she rebels against this (The Second Sex, 366). She draws blood and 
mutilates her body in anticipation of her changing body and a, perhaps violent, loss of virginity. 
She demonstrates to her “future lover: you will never inflict on me anything more horrible than I 
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inflict on myself” (Ibid., 367). Beauvoir asserts that although the girl, “destined to be passive 
prey, claims her freedom” through this act of violence, it is a form of “bad faith” because “it 
means she accepts, through her rejections, her future as a woman; she would not mutilate her 
flesh with hatred if first she did not recognize herself as flesh” (Ibid., 367).  I do not find the 
existential notion of “bad faith” appropriate for discussing the psychic condition of prisoners. 
However, Beauvoir’s account of self-mutilation in The Second Sex can still be helpful in the 
prison context. Her analysis helps us to understand that self-mutilation can be seen as an act of 
resistance, as the prisoner’s attempt to regain control over her own body and to create a visual 
representation of the psychological violence she is experiencing. Shedding one’s blood can be 
interpreted as an act of defiance against civil death—I’m not dead; I’m very much alive, and I 
still bleed. On the other hand, this act of resistance may also be an affirmation that one’s status 
has been reduced to that of a body. 
By contrast, Survival in Solitary (2008) offers numerous alternative political strategies for 
combating social and sensory deprivation and defying civil death. Again, in prison, the very act 
of survival can be seen as a form of resistance; James Swon writes that prisoners have one main 
objective: “Focus on surviving! And not dying,” that is, assert your living presence against a 
system which treats you otherwise (Ibid., 17). However, prisoner Paul Redd asserts that to 
survive solitary confinement, he must ensure that “only my body is being held captive. To put it 
more plainly, 95% of time daily is spent writing and thinking outside prison” (Ibid., 15, my 
emphasis). Thinking, then, can be understood not only as form of retreat, but as a form of escape.    
 Resistance, Redd asserts, also entails not only cultivating mental fortitude but also 
asserting one’s political presence. Redd advises others in solitary confinement to hold on to their 
senses of self through “studying your history, culture and yourself….[making] a real 
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commitment to your inner consciousness…[thinking] of ways you can make positive 
contributions to our peoples in the communities” and maintaining persistent communication with 
people outside the prison (Ibid., 16). In other words, survival in solitary involves both 
maintaining forms of historical, social, and political connectedness to other prisoners and the 
outside world, as well as cultivating mental focus and strength. Prisoners who “break” mentally 
under solitary conditions are the ones who fail to “make contact with the outside…their thinking 
[stays] contained within the isolated walls and soon isolation [consumes] them” (Ibid., 16). 
Prisoner John W. Perotti offers similar advice, stating that “[establishing] one-on-one contact” 
with other inmates as well and “maintaining outside contacts is very important” for cultivating a 
healthy sense of self and a context from which to combat prison abuse (Ibid., 19).  
Finally, because “control units exist…to crush the revolutionary spirit embodied within 
certain prisoners” Sondai Kamdibe, like Redd, also advocates cultivating (subjugated) historical 
knowledge as a form of resistance (Ibid., 20). This pursuit seems key for “going beyond” 
Arendt’s “liberal vision of togetherness” and her glorification of agonism at the purely individual 
level. Reading Kamdibe’s words, I am reminded of the scholarship of W.E.B Du Bois, who 
wrote:  
Have you hear the story of the conquest of German East Africa? Listen to the untold tale: 
there were 20,000 black men and 4,000 white men who talked German. There were 
20,000 black men and 12,000 white men who talked English…they struggled on 
mountain, hill and valley, in river, lake and swamp, until in masses they sickened, 
crawled and died…thousands of black men…and all you hear about it is that England and 
Belgium conquered German Africa for the allies!..Such is the true and stirring stuff of 
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which Romance is born and from this stuff come the stirrings of men who are beginning 
to remember that this kind of material is theirs. (“Criteria of Negro Art,” 997) 
For Arendt, the significance of true spontaneous action, which is characterized by 
"unpredictability” (Ibid, 191), can only be revealed through its reification through an historical 
narrative (Ibidl, 186-187). Once this process begins, however, that act can become potentially 
"boundless" in its "significance and truthfulness” (Ibid., 192), and its "tendency to force open all 
limitation and cut across all boundaries” (Ibid., 190). The political strategies of prisoners shed 
new light on Arendt’s insights about the importance of public and private spaces, on thinking and 
political life, and the role of speech and action in constituting these spaces. For Arendt, private 
spaces of reflection make political spaces possible. Privacy provides the space and distance for 
genuine thought, while the public space serves as the forum from which that thought can be 
expressed and understood.  The space of appearances, however, lies logically prior to our 
concept(s) of political community(ies). It would be impossible to make an exhaustive list of 
possible manifestations of spaces of appearance, because this space, the political, is not just a 
condition for the possibility of speech and action, but rather, is constitutive of speech and action. 
So, through speech and action, new possibilities for political community emerge as well. As 
such, Arendt can be helpful for thinking not only about possibilities for community formation, 
but also political transformation.  
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